

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, PFOR

SUBJECT: THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND ISSUES BEYOND ITS TRADITIONAL
AREA OF CONCERN

SUMMARY: DID THE SIGNATORS REALLY MEAN WHAT WAS SAID ABOUT ALLIED CON-

SULTATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION? IF SO --AND IF WE STILL DO--
THEN WE NEED TO THINK HARD ABOUT CONSULTATIONS ON BROADER CHALLENGES
TO ALLIED INTERESTS OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL EAST-WEST FOCUS OF
ALLIANCE CONCERNS. IN ALLIED CAPITALS, LEADERS ARE PREOCCUPIED TO
THE POINT OF OBSESSION WITH THREATS TO THE
SOCIETIES THEY GOVERN--THREATS THAT ARE NOT SOVIET IN ORIGIN OR
MILITARY IN NATURE. HOW MUCH INFORMATION DO WE AND OUR ALLIES WANT
TO SHARE ABOUT THESE ISSUES? HOW CAN WE USE NATO TO EXCHANGE IDEAS
ON THESE ISSUES? END SUMMARY

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1. THE ALLIES "ARE FIRMLY RESOLVED TO KEEP EACH OTHER FULLY
INFORMED AND TO STRENGTHEN THE PRACTICE OF FRANK AND TIMELY
CONSULTATIONS BY ALL MEANS WHICH MAY BE APPROPRIATE ON MATTERS
RELATING TO THEIR COMMON INTERESTS AS MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE,

BEARING IN MIND THAT THESE INTERESTS CAN BE AFFECTED BY EVENTS
IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD."

2. THAT IS WHAT THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION SAID: "CONSULTATIONS ON
MATTERS RELATING TO THEIR COMMON INTERESTS". BUT IF WE STEP BACK
FROM IT, AND FROM THE COMMITMENTS WE MADE AT THAT TIME ON CONSUL-
TATIONS--WE RECOGNIZE THAT THESE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN THE MOST DIFFICULT
FOR THE ALLIES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC TO CARRY OUT. THIS
WILL CLEARLY BE THE CASE WITH SOME OF THE ISSUES THAT THREATEN
ALLIANCE INTERESTS TODAY. THE FUTURE OF SPAIN, PORTUGAL, GREECE
AND YUGOSLAVIA, THE ENTIRE SOUTHERN LITTORAL, THE MIDDLE EAST,
INFLATION, UNEMPLOYMENT, THE SUPPLY OF ENERGY AND FOOD, TERRORISM--
THESE ARE TODAY'S CONCERNS THAT INCREASINGLY PREOCCUPY ALLIED
CAPITALS.

THESE ISSUES BEAR DIRECTLY ON ALLIANCE SECURITY, BUT ARE OUTSIDE THE
TRADITIONAL EAST-WEST FOCUS OF THE ALLIANCE.

3. THE FIFTEEN MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
HAVE PROVEN THAT THEY CAN DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH FAMILIAR ISSUES IN
PARTICULAR MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO THE SOVIET
THREAT AND THE EVOLUTION OF DETENTE. PERHAPS THEY COULD DEAL WELL WITH

DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THIS NARROW FOCUS IF THEY WERE DOCILE AND SIMPLY
FOLLOWED U.S. ORDERS--WHICH THEY ARE NOT AND WILL NOT. CONSEQUENTLY,
ALLIED ACTIONS ON DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL FOCUS OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY--EVEN THOSE THAT BEAR HEAVILY ON THE
POLITICAL AND SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE TREATY AREA--WILL NOT
BE COORDINATED UNLESS THE ALLIANCE MAKES A GREATER EFFORT TO FORSEE
AND
DEVELOP APPROACHES TO SUCH ISSUES.

4. PART OF THE DIFFICULTY IS THE POLITICAL RELUCTANCE OF SOME
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NATO MEMBERS TO CONSULT OR TO DO CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN NATO
ON WHAT THEY REGARD AS "NON-NATO" ISSUES. SOME INSIST NORTH
AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS AND INTERESTS DIVERGE AND THUS
ONLY STRICTLY CONSTRUED EAST-WEST MILITARY MATTERS SHOULD BE ON THE
ALLIANCE AGENDA. OTHERS RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR A COORDINATED APPROACH
TO THESE NEW CHALLENGES BUT INSIST IT BE IN OTHER FORUMS.
BUT PART OF THE PROBLEM IS THAT, EVEN WITHIN POLITICALLY AND GEO-
GRAPHICALLY ACCEPTABLE PARAMETERS, MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE
RARELY EXCHANGED VIEWS ON HOW THEY MIGHT REACT TO POSSIBLE CRISES.
WHEN NEW ISSUES ARISE THAT MEMBER GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOT DECIDED IN
ADVANCE TO WORK ON TOGETHER, THEY CANNOT SUDDENLY TAKE EFFECTIVE
CONCERTED ACTION FROM A DEAD START. OCTOBER 1973 AND JULY 1974
BORE WITNESS TO ALLIANCE INABILITY TO ACT IN CONCERT ON THE MIDDLE
EAST AND CYPRUS. TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THE CHARGE OF FAILURE IN THESE
TWO
CRISES IS A BUM RAP SINCE IT IS UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT THE ALLIANCE
TO RESPOND TO SITUATIONS WITH WHICH THE MEMBERS ARE NOT FULLY AWARE
AND WITH WHICH IT IS NOT PREPARED TO DEAL, PARTICULARLY WHEN TWO

SOVEREIGN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE ARE INVOLVED. BUT THE ALLIANCE HAS NOW HAD RECENT VIVID DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE NEED TO ADJUST TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. NEW ERUPTIONS WILL OCCUR. WE KNOW THIS. THE QUESTION IS HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES EXERCISE LEADERSHIP SO THAT THE NATO MECHANISM CAN BE USED TO DRAW OUT ALLIES, TO EXCHANGE IDEAS, AND TO PREPARE WITH OUR PARTNERS FOR AT LEAST SOME OF THE POTENTIAL CRISES BEFORE THEY OCCUR? WILL WE DEVELOP AN INFORMATION BASE ABOUT WHAT ALLIES ARE LIKELY TO DO INDIVIDUALLY, IF NOT AS AN ALLIANCE, ABOUT THE EVOLVING THREATS TO ALLIANCE INTERESTS? WILL WE TAKE STEPS TO INSURE THAT, AT A MINIMUM, IF MEMBER COUNTRIES CAN NOT WORK TOGETHER IN CRISIS SITUATIONS, AT LEAST THEY WILL NOT WORK AT CROSS PURPOSES OR INHIBIT THE OTHERS FROM WORKING TOGETHER.

6. FOR A QUARTER OF A CENTURY NATO ALLIES HAVE MEDITATED AND SOUL-SEARCHED--WE HAVE PRONOUNCED, DENOUNCED, AND COMPROMISED--ON THE QUESTION OF CONSULTATIONS, AND WE HAVE STILL NOT FOUND ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY ANSWERS. NOR HAVE WE FOUND THEM IN THESE PAST TWO YEARS. CONSULTATION IS, INHERENTLY AND ALWAYS ONLY A RELATIVELY SUCCESSFUL PROCESS. BUT SOME NEXT STEPS SEEM CLEAR:

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A. THE U.S. MUST CONTINUE TO PRESS IN EXISTING NATO FORUMS FOR CONSULTATIONS ON MAJOR ISSUES WHICH MAY LIE BEYOND THE ALLIANCE'S TRADITIONAL AREA OF CONCERN. WE MUST ALSO TRY TO MAKE GREATER USE OF THESE FORUMS TO IDENTIFY FUTURE ISSUES AND DEVELOP INCREASED FAMILIARITY WITH NEW CHALLENGES.

B. WE WILL ALSO NEED TO REMAIN ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF DISCUSSING SOME NEW ISSUES AT NATO IN STUDY GROUPS OR IN AD HOC GROUPS. I DO NOT MEAN A PROLIFERATION OF FORMAL ACTIVITIES, BUT RATHER A RECOGNITION THAT WE NEED NOT DISCUSS ALL ISSUES IN THE NAC OR SPC, AND NOT NECESSARILY AT FIFTEEN.

C. AN ESSENTIAL TASK IN THE PROCESS WILL BE FOR WASHINGTON TO IDENTIFY MAJOR ISSUES THAT MAY AFFECT THE ALLIANCE AND DECIDE HOW MUCH WE CAN DO AND SHOULD DO AT NATO ON THESE ISSUES.

D. A FIRST STEP MIGHT BE A POST MORTEM WITHIN THE USG OF THE RECENT MIDDLE EAST AND CYPRUS CRISES TO SEE WHAT DIFFERENT ACTIONS, IF ANY, COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY THE ALLIANCE OR INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS TO AFFECT THE COURSE OF EVENTS. THIS MIGHT HELP IDENTIFY WHAT MODIFICATIONS OUR CONSULTATION PROCESS WILL NEED TO ACT SWIFTLY AND DECISIVELY.

E. ANOTHER STEP MIGHT BE TO GAME A HYPOTHETICAL CRISIS: FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESENT SITUATION IN PORTUGAL DETERIORATES. SPAIN MOVES TO STRENGTHEN HER POSITION ALONG THE COMMON FRONTIER.

WHAT WOULD WE WANT TO TELL OUR ALLIES ABOUT HOW WE WOULD REACT?
WHAT WOULD WE WANT TO KNOW ABOUT WHAT OUR ALLIES MIGHT DO?

7. IN SHORT, THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIES WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY ENGAGE
IN SUCCESSFUL CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION, AS THE OTTAWA ATLANTIC
DECLARATION SAYS THEY ARE RESOLVED TO DO. THEY MUST BE INSPRIED
AND LED TO TRANSLATE THEIR DECLARED RESOLVE INTO PRACTICE.
THE USG SHOULD ITENSIFY EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY
TODAYS ISSUES AND PREOCCUPATIONS AND TAKE INITIATIVES TO
DEVELOP BETTER WAYS FOR ALL OF US TO DEAL WITH THEM
RUMSFELD

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